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UNDERSTANDING ACRE FOR COTTON 
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 was passed into law on May 22, 2008 
with veto override votes in the House of Representatives and the Senate (House 2008).  
A difference between the 2002 and the 2008 bills is the newly instituted revenue-
based counter-cyclical program called the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) 
program available beginning crop year 2009.  The ACRE program is offered as an 
alternative to the counter-cyclical payment (CCP) program that was in place during the 
2002-2008 period.  Beginning with the 2009 crop year, producers will have the option 
to enroll their farm in either the CCP program or the ACRE program.  If ACRE is 
elected, producers cannot change program participation for the duration of the 2008 
farm bill (ERS 2008).  This is a very complex decision due to the number of variables 
that must be considered and depends on the individual farm situation.  It requires 
that farms, rather than crops or commodities, enter the program, so that the decision 
relies on the impacts of program choice on farm income.  That aside, understanding 
commodity situations is a first step toward understanding and making decisions on 
individual farm situations.  The purpose of this briefing paper is to provide assistance 
in understanding the differences between the ACRE and CCP programs for one crop, 
cotton, in one state, Texas.  The briefing paper will also show the results of a 
comparison between CCP and ACRE payments using a sample of actual farm data. 
Background on ACRE 
The ACRE program is an average revenue guarantee for participants based on two 
different benchmarks—farm level and state level revenue.  It provides producers with 
payments for a commodity when the actual state revenue for a commodity falls short 
of the state-based revenue guarantee AND the farm revenue falls below the benchmark 
farm revenue. The purpose of the ACRE program is to provide some measure of 
revenue assurance to farmers against both low yields and price drops.  Table 1 shows 
a side-by-side comparison of the key provisions of the CCP and ACRE programs.   
 
Some key features of the ACRE and CCP programs for cotton need to be underscored.  
First, the loan rate remains at 52¢/lb. if the producer elects to participate in the CCP 
program.  However, if a producer elects to participate in the ACRE program, the loan 
rate declines to 36.4¢/lb.  Also, the direct payment rate under the CCP election is 
6.67¢/lb., whereas the direct payment rate is 5.336¢/lb. if ACRE is chosen.  The 
target price, however, remains the same.  Finally, annual payments are calculated 
differently (described below); but, both CCP and ACRE payments are based on 83.3% 
of base acres for crops in 2009-11 and 85% for crops in 2012 (ERS 2008). 
ACRE and CCP Calculations 
A brief description of the formulas outlined in Table 1 for the ACRE calculation vs. 
CCP is provided as follows.  3 
 
Counter-Cyclical Payment (CCP) Calculation:  
To calculate the 
payment rate, one 
needs to know 
the target price, 
the direct 
payment rate, 
and the market 
year average MYA 
price (produced 
by USDA)2 and 
the loan rate.  
Simply take the 
target price and 
subtract the direct payment rate.  Then, subtract the higher of the market year 
average price or the loan rate.  This determines the CCP payment rate.  For example, 
assume that the market year average price is below the loan rate.  To calculate the 
CCP payment rate, we then take the target price (71.25¢/lb) and subtract the direct 
payment rate (6.67¢/lb) and the loan rate (52¢/lb), resulting in a CCP payment rate of 
12.6¢/lb. 
Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) Calculation:  
First, one must determine the ACRE benchmark state yield. The benchmark is the 
―Olympic average‖ of state’s yield per planted acre for most 5 recent crop years 
 
An Olympic average takes the previous 5 years state level yields, throws out the 
highest and lowest yields, and then averages the remaining 3 years of yields. 
                                                           
2 The MYA is determined by USDA as the average price received by producers during that 
crop’s marketing year.  The MYA is used in a number of USDA programs and policies and is 
published and widely available. 4 
 
Next, one must find the ACRE state revenue guarantee, which is the 2 most recent 
crop years’ national market year average (MYA) price × ACRE benchmark state yield × 
90%.  Finally, the ACRE state actual revenue is the state yield per planted acre × the 




   
Next, one must examine the farm level revenue: 
First, the ACRE benchmark farm revenue is determined by taking the (5-yr Olympic 
average farm crop yield per planted acre × 2 year MYA Price as above) + crop 
insurance indemnities per acre.  This calculation provides the historical average farm 
revenue for comparison with the current farm revenue.  The current ACRE actual 
farm revenue is the actual commodity farm yield per planted acre  × the ACRE 




Now, if the state level trigger AND the farm level trigger are met, we can calculate the 












First trigger: if ACRE state actual revenue <  ACRE state revenue guarantee, then 
farmers in the state meet the first condition for receiving ACRE protection 
payments.  
 
Second trigger: if ACRE actual farm revenue <  ACRE benchmark farm revenue, 
then the farm meets the second condition for receiving ACRE protection payments. 
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The above calculations should provide a sense of the complexity of the decision-
making process for the ACRE decision.  To assist in understanding how these 
calculations translate into actual farm outcomes, we conducted a comparison of CCP 
and ACRE outcomes in the recent past. 
Historical Comparison of ACRE and CCP on Cotton Farms 
The following provides examples of the calculations for a sample of four actual farms 
in the southern Texas High Plains for the cotton portions of those farms; note that this 
is for the cotton acres on the farms only, not for the entire farms.  The examples show 
what the program payments would have been under the CCP and ACRE options if 
both programs had been in effect during the periods of past years shown.  The 
historical calculations are useful to provide perspective for decision makers, but they 
do not forecast the future. 
Table 2 presents the state-level guaranteed revenue and actual revenue calculations 
based on historic price and yield information for Texas cotton. Note that had both 
programs been in effect during the past six years, all Texas cotton producers in the 
CCP program would have been eligible for CCP payments (ranging from $.05/lb. to 
$.126/lb.), while those in the ACRE program would have been eligible for ACRE 
program payments (the first trigger would have been met) only once in the last five 
years on dryland cotton and not at all on irrigated cotton.  Thus, if future price and 
state-level yield patterns of the recent past continue, the state level trigger appears 
unlikely to be met.3 
To examine the farm-level trigger for ACRE payments, we examined recent production 
histories of cotton from four Texas cotton farms described below: 
Cotton Production Type  Base Acres  Payment Yield (lb/ac) 
Irrigated (farm 1)  121.2  411 
Irrigated (farm 2)  120.3  398 
Dryland (farm 3)  18.3  134 
Dryland (farm 4)  32.6  166 
 
Table 3 provides the data on what the ACRE program would have produced for these 
four farms over the most recent six crop years.  Each of the two irrigated farms would 
have met the farm-level trigger for ACRE payments in two of the six years (different 
years).  One dryland farm would have met the trigger in four of the six years and one 
                                                           
3 While the past five years of data reflect the most recent statewide yield/revenue relationships, 
it should be noted that over the past 20 years, the statewide trigger would have been met 20% 
of the time for irrigated and 45% of the time for dryland.  We use the past 5 years because that 
is the relevant time period for calculations and is also the time period for which we have farm 
level data.  Nevertheless, readers should be aware that the potential frequency of meeting the 
trigger is much higher than observed here, especially for dryland cotton. 6 
 
would have met it in three years.  The more frequent meeting of the trigger for dryland 
farms is not surprising given that yield variability is expected to be less on irrigated 
farms.4  However, the farm-level trigger alone does not qualify a farm for the ACRE 
payment; both the state-level and farm-level triggers must be met.  Thus, in this 
example for these four farms, the state trigger is met in only 2006 for dryland farms 
only; the two dryland farms (3 and 4) would have qualified for ACRE payments (and 
only in 2006).  These results occur because in a state of the size and diversity of 
Texas, individual farm yields are not highly correlated with state average yields. 
The income that would have been generated under both the ACRE and CCP program 
from these four farms over the six years is compared in Table 4.  Here, we simply took 
the actual farm yield times the MYA price and then added the respective (CCP or 
ACRE) payments along with marketing loan gains and direct payments.  Over the past 
years, if both programs had been in place, CCP would have resulted in significantly 
higher cotton revenue for the two irrigated cotton farms and one of the dryland farms.  
Although farm revenue was numerically higher for farm 4, the difference was not 
statistically significant.  The implication of this finding is that CCP clearly 
outperformed ACRE for these irrigated farms, but we are less certain about the 
outcome for dryland farms.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
Comparative outcomes for individual farms vary primarily with U.S. average prices, 
state level yields, and farm level yields.  In this section, we examine the sensitivity of 
the results presented above to selected alternative price and yield scenarios. Table 5 
presents the basic results.  
Case 1. US cotton prices higher by 50%. 
In this case, the actual state revenue would have been less than the ACRE state 
revenue guarantee over the last six years for both irrigated and dryland cotton 
in1999/2000 and 2001/02. However, the state-level trigger results would be the same 
as baseline between 2002/03-2007/08. The CCP payment rate would have been zero 
due to the price increase.  The implication of this finding is that rapid and large 
increases in price make the ACRE program more attractive relative to the CCP.  
However, because the CCP and ACRE program are both triggered off the 2-year 
average of the MYA price, rapid increases in the price will quickly be reflected in the 
MYA price, thereby negating the initial advantage of the ACRE program.   
Case 2. US cotton prices lower by 50%. 
In this scenario, the CCP rate would achieve its maximum value ($0.126/lb) for most 
of the years in the simulation. However, comparing the ACRE state revenue guarantee 
and state actual revenue indicates that farmers would still have had zero payments in 
most of the years.  Thus, it appears that lower prices favor the CCP program over the 
ACRE program under identical yield outcomes.  
                                                           
4 These farms do not constitute a random sample and the results, therefore, are not 
generalizable to the population of farms.  They are for demonstration purposes only and should 
not be sonstrued as a prediction of farms in general. 7 
 
Case 3. US cotton prices lower by 50% and state average yields higher by  
50%. 
 
In this scenario, CCP rate would have been the same with case 2. However, farmers 
would still have zero payments under ACRE in most of the years.   
Case 4. US cotton prices higher by 50% and state average yields lower by  
50%. 
 






This briefing paper aims facilitate cotton farmers’ understanding of issues that figure 
into the choice between enrolling in the ACRE or CCP programs – a choice they have to 
make in 2009.  Comparing the CCP and ACRE programs based on historical prices 
and yields reveal that even if farm actual revenue is less than the farm benchmark 
revenue, farmers would receive nothing from ACRE program if actual state revenue is 
more than the state guarantee. However, farmers would receive CCP as long as 
national average market price is less than 64.58 cents/lb. 
There are several key caveats that decision makers should consider.   
1.  ACRE is a one-time election.  Once a producer makes the decision to 
participate in the ACRE program with a crop, they cannot return to the CCP 
program with that crop over the 5 years of the farm bill. 
2.  What if I want to produce crops different than my base?  The law appears to 
be written so that farms can produce anything besides fruits and vegetables 
without losing eligibility for payments.  However, the law states that a 5-year 
production history is needed to calculate payments.  It is not clear how USDA 
will handle production history determination with a new crop. 
3.  ACRE is a whole-farm decision.  While this analysis has only addressed cotton 
in isolation and only in Texas, farmers should be aware that because of 
planting flexibility, it may be advantageous to plant crops other than cotton 
despite having a cotton base.  This, of course, complicates the decision.  This 
analysis nevertheless provides partial information relevant to the decision. 
4.  ACRE impacts are extremely individual in nature.  Because ACRE is 
triggered off farm revenue in part, the impacts of ACRE cannot be predicted 
across all farms.  So, while we can provide examples and case studies to help 
guide your decision, our models are no substitute for your own analysis based 
on the calculation procedures outlined here. 
5.  Past history is instructive, but not conclusive.  The results here depend on 
the relationship (correlation) between the farm level and state level yields.  
Note that none of the cases led to a change in the state triggers from the 
baseline; only the probability of a state and farm trigger being met at the same 
time changes. 8 
 
Looking only at past history is instructive inasmuch as the correlations in the 
past persist into the future.  But, decision-makers should be aware that these 
relationships can change through time. 
Finally, the ACRE/CCP decision is not without risk.  The caveats above are 
intended to highlight some of the factors that should be considered, but, as always, 
conditions can and do change, resulting in unforeseen outcomes.  Decision-makers 




NOTE: CERI is developing a web-based tool to aid producers and their advisors in examining 
their individual situations.  At present, the target date for release of this November.  It will be 
available at www.aaec.ttu.edu/ceri/acreevaluator.php 9 
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Table 1. A comparison between CCP and ACRE programs 
Program Name  CCP program  ACRE program 
Loan Rate  Fixed at 52¢/lb  36.4 ¢/lb 
Direct payments  6.67¢/lb  5.336 ¢/lb 
Target price  71.25 ¢/lb  71.25 ¢/lb 
Counter-Cyclical 
payment (CCP) 
Based on Fixed program yields and acreages; CCP are available 
whenever the effective price is less than the target price. The payment 
amount is equal to the product of the payment rate, the payment 
acres (85% of base acres), and the payment yield.  
The effective price is equal to the sum of 1) the higher of the national 
average farm price for the marketing year or the national loan rate and 
2) the direct payment rate 
Payment ratecotton = (target price)cotton – (direct payment rate)cotton – 
(higher of commodity price or loan rate)cotton; 




Offers producers the option of enrolling in a new revenue-based counter-
cyclical program: Creates the new Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) 
program beginning in crop year 2009; ACRE is a state-based revenue 
guarantee for participants based on the 5-year state average yield and the 
2-year national average price; ACRE provides producers with payments for a 
commodity when the actual state revenue for the commodity is less than the 
revenue guarantee.  
To receive ACRE, producers have to give up CCP, 20% direct payments, 30% 
loan rate.  
Payment Determination - There are two tests that must be met for 
producers to receive payments under the ACRE program – at the state and 
farm levels. Eligible producers receive payment if actual state revenue for a 
crop is less than the state ACRE program guarantee for that crop AND only 
if the actual farm revenue for a crop is less than the farm ACRE benchmark 
revenue for the crop 
ACRE State Program Guarantee - 90% * (5-yr Olympic rolling avg state 
yield per planted acre) * (2-yr rolling avg of national average market price) 
(Note that the national average market price is defined as higher of national 
MYA price and marketing loan rate); Starting in 2010, the ACRE guarantee 
shall not increase or decrease by more than 10% from the preceding crop 
year. Provisions to allow separate guarantees for irrigated and non-irrigated 
land under certain conditions. 
Actual State Revenue - Actual state yield per planted acre * higher of 
national avg. market price and marketing loan rate  
Actual Farm Revenue - Actual farm yield * higher of national MYA price 
and marketing loan rate 
Farm ACRE Benchmark Revenue - (5-yr Olympic rolling avg farm yield) * 
(2-yr rolling avg national market price) + crop insurance premium 
(Note: any increased insurance premiums are reflected in benchmark but 
actual revenue does not include indemnities) 
Payment Rate per Acre - Lesser of (ACRE State Program Guarantee - 
Actual State Revenue) and 25% of ACRE State Program Guarantee 
Payment Acres - 83.3% of Planted or considered planted in '09-11; 85% of 
PCP in '12; PCP may not exceed total base acres on the farm 
Individual Farmer Payments - Payment Rate * Payment Acres * (5-yr 
Olympic rolling avg farm yield / 5-yr Olympic rolling avg state yield) 11 
 
Table 2. State-level ACRE and CCP Program Calculations for Cotton in Texas    























2002/03  0.43  696.78  562.85  187.91  302.33  No 
 
0.126 
2003/04  0.60  454.40  578.43  268.13  270.91  No  0.050 
2004/05  0.43  842.38  522.52  240.78  360.37  No  0.126 
2005/06  0.47  918.26  578.06  234.35  434.43  No  0.126 
2006/07  0.46  877.80  703.30  296.86  408.09  No  0.126 
2007/08  0.57  1043.48  805.66  376.72  599.17  No  0.072 
----------Dryland---------- 
 
2002/03  0.43  200.46  236.30  78.89  115.85  No  0.126 
2003/04  0.60  349.86  220.06  102.01  187.94  No  0.050 
2004/05  0.43  121.65  262.08  120.77  215.65  No  0.126 
2005/06  0.47  316.36  262.08  106.25  251.35  No  0.126 
2006/07  0.46  216.06  362.11  152.84  81.57  Yes  0.126 
2007/08  0.57  219.06  362.11  169.32  382.80  No  0.072 
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Farm 1             
2002/03  672.00  518.00  203.26  291.58  No 
2003/04  0.00  569.33  304.41  0.00  Yes 
2004/05  1098.00  408.33  222.73  469.72  No 
2005/06  1016.00  460.67  218.62  480.67  No 
2006/07  737.00  574.33  283.67  342.63  No 
2007/08  25.00  808.33  434.43  14.36  Yes 
Farm 2           
2002/03  703.00  518.00  204.31  305.03  No 
2003/04  0.00  348.33  191.57  0.00  Yes 
2004/05  1036.00  410.00  190.70  443.20  No 
2005/06  942.00  237.33  197.03  445.66  No 
2006/07  578.00  579.67  273.66  268.71  Yes 
2007/08  910.00  659.33  399.98  522.52  No 
Farm 3           
2002/03  216.00  276.33  116.13  93.72  Yes 
2003/04  0.00  234.00  132.62  0.00  Yes 
2004/05  1141.00  234.00  134.89  488.12  No 
2005/06  1181.00  234.00  116.99  558.73  No 
2006/07  158.00  534.67  265.55  73.45  Yes 
2007/08  0.00  505.00  277.16  0.00  Yes 
Farm 4           
2002/03  0.00  103.00  51.54  0.00  Yes 
2003/04  427.00  103.00  70.02  254.58  No 
2004/05  0.00  108.33  55.47  0.00  Yes 
2005/06  609.00  74.00  47.89  288.12  No 
2006/07  13.00  182.00  97.96  6.04  Yes 
2007/08  616.00  146.67  89.29  353.71  No 
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Table 4.  Comparison of Example Cotton Farm Revenue Under the CCP and ACRE 
Programs for the Past Six Years.a 
 
Farm revenue 
Under the CCP 
Program 
Farm revenue 





Farm 1        
2002/03  50,416  37,281   
2003/04  4,844  2,259   
2004/05  77,453  59,483   
2005/06  72,590  60,135   
2006/07  55,239  43,349   
2007/08  7,947  3,986   
Average*  44,748  34,416  30% 
       
Farm 2       
2002/03  53,381  38,537   
2003/04  4,776  2,172   
2004/05  72,279  55,763   
2005/06  67,710  55,433   
2006/07  45,629  34,157   
2007/08  68,922  64,571   
Average*  52,116  41,772  25% 
       
Farm 3       
2002/03  2,776  1,811   
2003/04  351  111   
2004/05  11,357  9,090   
2005/06  12,052  10,269   
2006/07  2,458  2,302   
2007/08  334  111   
Average*  4,889  3,949  24% 
       
Farm 4       
2002/03  326  245   
2003/04  8,669  8,598   
2004/05  307  245   
2005/06  11,186  9,577   
2006/07  1,352  962   
2007/08  12,184  11,692   
Average  5,671  5,220  9% 
a  These calculations are for cotton only.  If a farmer produced something other than 
cotton on acreage, marketing loan gains and ACRE payments were not included. 
*   CCP and ACRE average revenues are statistically different at the 0.05 level of 
significance.   14 
 
Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis for Different Possible Cases of Price and Yield Changes. 
    Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 




















Irrigated                   
  2002/03  0.000  No  0.126  No  0.000  No  0.126  No 
  2003/04  0.000  No  0.126  No  0.000  No  0.126  No 
  2004/05  0.004  No  0.126  No  0.004  No  0.126  No 
  2005/06  0.000  No  0.126  No  0.000  No  0.126  No 
  2006/07  0.000  No  0.126  No  0.000  No  0.126  No 
  2007/08  0.000  No  0.126  No  0.000  No  0.126  No 
Dryland                   
  2002/03  0.000  No  0.126  No  0.000  No  0.126  No 
  2003/04  0.000  No  0.126  No  0.000  No  0.126  No 
  2004/05  0.004  No  0.126  No  0.004  No  0.126  No 
  2005/06  0.000  No  0.126  No  0.000  No  0.126  No 
  2006/07  0.000  Yes  0.126  Yes  0.000  Yes  0.126  Yes 
  2007/08  0.000  No  0.126  No  0.000  No  0.126  No 
 